



Combatant Logistics Command & Control

**Professor David Schradly
Naval Postgraduate
School
Monterey, California**



Logistics Command & Control

Joint Doctrine says that

"to exercise control at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, commanders must also exercise control over logistics"

Control requires information and logistics is not in any commander's Command & Control system.

Dominant awareness is a watchword, but it doesn't yet include logistics awareness.

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Logistics Command & Control

"While warfighting needs set logistics requirements, logistics capabilities will limit warfighting potential and the courses of action available to field commanders"

Logistics is frequently thought of as administrative rather than operational and tactical.

However, running out of bullets or gas is terribly operational.

Look at Gulf War for the kinds of logistics information and capabilities needed.

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Background

Logistics is normally ignored absent actual conflict.

Vietnam conflict begins with logistics planning factors left over from WWII and Korea.

1970s: All Volunteer Force and R&D on cruise missiles, smart weapons, stealth.

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Background

1980s: Procurement of stealth and smart weapons, fast sealift ships, and preposition ships

All have impact in Gulf War

However, Gulf War begins with logistics planning factors left over from Vietnam

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Summer 1990

Kuwait and UAE have depressed oil prices by overproducing. OPEC fails to control. Iraq has big debt.

Late June Iraq threatens overproducers. Iraq issues new threats on 17 July. A week later, Iraq deploys forces on Kuwaiti border. The U.S. wages words and watches.

Iraq invades Kuwait on 2 August.

On 6 August, President Bush announces that U.S. forces will defend Saudi Arabia.

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Summer 1990

By 8 August, first 82nd Airborne troops fly in, first USAF fighters arrive, *Eisenhower* battle group in Red Sea and *Independence* battle group in Gulf of Oman.

The U.S. has no infrastructure in the region, no bases, no facilities. There is also no OPLAN.

The Joint Force Commander, Gen. Schwarzkopf, wants forces deployed immediately, no priorities assigned.

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Summer 1990

General Schwarzkopf decides he must have forces ahead of their combat service support.

Doctrine says, *Commanders must be able to call forward in a timely manner those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.*"

Over the Fall, the operation grows from the defense of Saudi Arabia to include the liberation of Kuwait and involves more than half a million U.S. and Coalition forces.

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Logistics

Gen. Schwarzkopf began by setting a requirement for 30 days of supply (DOS) in theater and, as is his call, upped it to 60 DOS.

The footprint of 60 DOS was later seen as a liability and has been a principal factor motivating *Focused Logistics*.

60 DOS was a brute force response to the lack of tools for sustainment planning.

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Deployment Problems

Forces flowed into theater but they didn't know where they were going.

Stuff flowed into theater addressed to "Desert Shield."

The TPFDD was frozen and JOPES was turned off. Planning was done with pencil. Everything was priority one.

While there was supposed to be a plan for flowing forces and stuff into theater (OPLAN and TPFDD), there was not even recognition of the need for a plan for distribution within theater.

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Deployment Problems

JOPES could not track partially deployed units and therefore unit closure.

Asset visibility was lost the moment anything entered the transportation system.

Airlift computer model could not indicate bottlenecks.

Absent a plan, mobility capability was the de facto mobility requirement.

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CSS Problems

Ordnance inventory information was bad for the Navy and Air Force.

Marines lacked trucks, tankers (bousers), and heavy equipment transporters.

COMNAVLOGJAM in Bahrain never knew the location of the forces they were supporting.

SALTS had to be invented by the Navy Supply Corps to circumvent the overloaded and non-responsive Navy message system.

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CSS Problems

LTG Pagonis said he was the single and authoritative logistics point of contact for the Joint Force Commander. He rarely had info on USAF, USMC, USN or Coalition forces.

The daily logistics summaries for CINCENT enumerated flights arrived yesterday and to-date, ditto ships, ditto personnel and pallets. Ordnance was reported in terms of tons or truckloads rather than what is was and who it belonged to.

Having dictated a requirement for 60 DOS, there was no reporting of its progress or attainability.

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Logistics Post-Gulf War

Logistics not forgotten after the Gulf War because:

There were serious problems to be fixed.

The Revolution in Military Affairs should impact logistics too.

Budget levels require more with less in everything including logistics.

Focused Logistics was one of the four new operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010.

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Focused Logistics Initiatives

Recognition of deployment as the first obstacle to effective combat operations.

Asset visibility and in-transit visibility.

Movement away from a supply (inventory)-based logistics system to a transportation-based system.

Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI).

Theater Distribution.

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Focused Logistics Initiatives

JRSOI and Theater Distribution are described as tenets of Focused Logistics.

Little progress on logistics command and control directly.

Global Combat Support System (GCSS) is a kluge of available info on asset visibility, finance, procurement, medical, transportation, and personnel.

Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control is intended to be an organization, not an information system.

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Tools Needed

The Joint Force Commander needs tools and information within his Command & Control system that allow him to plan, track, and predict logistics sustainability.

He needs a common picture of the battlefield logistically speaking, inclusive of what is there and what is flowing in.

Information, as defined here, is data which has been processed to yield sustainability predictions or capability assessments.

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Conclusion

The software to do this does not exist. Existing logistics software is mostly supply and maintenance focused and serves an accounting function.

The fundamental deficiency is the lack of models of force sustainability and distribution capability.

Without recognition of the need for logistics in the commander's command & control system and the development of models for sustainability prediction and assessment, focused logistics will not happen.

In Naval War College Review, Summer 1999, pp 49-75.

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