

How to include the mental component?

Scenario development for Crisis Response Operations

TNO Defence Research



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Contents

- Why scenario development for Crisis Response Operations?
- Why description of the mental component?
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- Results
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Aims of scenarios

- **Common view of future operations and tasks**
 - Reference for building an Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) equipped and trained for tasks
- **Basis for analysis/research within**
 - Procurement process
 - Doctrine development process
- **Facilitation interdisciplinary co-operation**
 - OR-researchers
 - Policy makers
 - Military experts



Scenario requirements

- **Results supported by the RNLA**
- **Generic**
- **Realistic**
- **Accessible for users**


Thus: RNLA scenario development in co-operation with TNO



Why description of the mental component? (1)

Development of military power: components


- Conceptual
- Physical
- Mental



Why description of the mental component? (2)


Regular operations

- Physical component adversary
- Materiel and unit driven
- Description by war-gaming



Irregular operations

How to include adversary's mental component in a scenario?



Source: Royal Netherlands Army



Case study: Peace Enforcing

Starting points

- Irregular, asymmetric conflict
- Peace Enforcing

How to include the mental component?

- Preparation for scenario characteristics
- Confrontation and collaboration analysis (CCA)



Case study: Preparation


- **Brainstorm scenario characteristics**
- **Grouping characteristics in sub-classes**
- **Sub-classes used to fill in scenario**

Including the mental component...




Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA)

- Methodology based on 'Confrontation Analysis', Nigel Howard, CCRP (1999)
- Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA)
 - Role play with confrontations
 - Actions as a means of coercion
 - Actions with or without units or materiel



CCA (2): six phases of conflict resolution




CCA (3): strategic relationships and intentions

- Military experts play roles of key figures
- Strategic relationships and intentions:
 - Each key figure answers the following questions:
 - What do I think another key figure expects of me?
 - Which means of coercion could he use to persuade me?
 - What do I expect of other key figures?
 - Which means of coercion could I use to persuade them?
- Choice of event



CCA (4): steps for conflict resolution

- Step 1: Analysis of present situation
- Step 2: Scheduling confrontations
- Step 3: **Confrontations**
 - Testing one's impressions
 - If necessary threaten with means of coercion or making a promise
- Step 4: **Ending the conversation**
 - Key figure decides whether or not
 - to execute a threat
 - to redeem one's promise



CCA (5): description

- **Description preparation and execution steps in an outline**
- **Advantage:**
 - Steps are reproducible
 - All developments can be traced back



Results

For scenarios of irregular operations in CRO:

- **Set of descriptions of:**
 - scenario characteristics
 - characters of key figures
 - events
- **Especially are valuable:**
 - starting positions
 - desired end-states
- **Scenario set enables further research for specific purposes**



Evaluation CCA

- **CCA is:**
 - Useful
 - Supplementary to war-gaming
- **Refinement is needed**

- **Is evolution within scenarios realistic and generic enough if CCA is used?**

- **Difficult to predict behaviour of persons of other cultures.**



The way ahead?

- **TNO and RNLA: Further familiarisation with CRO needed**
- **Experimentation**
- **Validation**
- **Modelling**



**Suggestion for
further reading on
your home journey...**



Suggestion for further reading on your home journey...


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Scenario Development for Crisis Response Operations

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TNO Defence Research is engaged in scenario development with the aim of supporting policy making, doctrine development and investment decisions for the armed services. Since the influence of the mental component on Crisis Response Operations (CRO)¹ is of great importance, this component, which pervades any scenario, needs to be addressed more explicitly during the development of scenarios. This implies that the armed forces' capabilities to engage the adversary's mental state should be made more conspicuous.

TNO's experience is that methods of scenario development used thus far are focused almost exclusively on the physical component and the engagement of the adversary's mental component is heavily under-exposed. This paper describes a method developed by TNO which incorporates the mental component -with to the physical component- in scenarios of Crisis Response Operations.

Introduction

In Crisis Response Operations (CRO) the success of the mission will most likely depend on striking the mental component of the enemy. Firstly because there will be an asymmetry between the rivaling parties with respect to their means. Opponents will increasingly not be in possession of a large amount of heavy (weapon) systems. The physical component of the enemy therefore cannot easily be recognised and even less easily be hit. Secondly the armed services taking action in the context of a CRO are guests in a country and it is therefore desirable to avoid (collateral) damage as much as possible. This desire is enforced by the fact that the intervening force is supposed to build up the country. It is hoped that the conflict can

be resolved by effectively influencing the mental component of the contending parties without using violence.

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the main tasks of the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) has become to carry out CRO. To perform well in this new context, the army needs being equipped and trained in an effective way. To establish this, there is a need of a common view of operations and the tasks the RNLA will be involved in. Based on that vision, decisions can be made for building and reorganising the Army.

TNO has developed a method to describe operational scenarios of CRO. This is done within the joint TNO and RNLA activities on scenario development. We shall discuss some characteristics of CRO and the concept of

¹ One can also read 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) instead of Crisis Response Operations (CRO).



Questions? Suggestions?



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If you want to receive these slides?

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