

Investment in the (Military) OA-Capital

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Investment in the (Military) OA-Capital

- Introduction
- Background and Approach
- Contemporary and Future Security Problems
- Possible Contributions from the (Military) OA.

Introduction

What is Military OA?

- A selection of methods of use for solving military problems
- The process of giving analytical support to decision-making on military problems
- The activities of OA-personnel working for military customers

Areas of competence for Military Analysts

- ❖ Knowledge of methods
- ❖ Knowledge of substance
- ❖ Knowledge of organisations, processes, cultures...

Disclaimer

- My own opinions...
- OA experience mainly from Sweden but not only...

Characteristics of Military OA during the Cold War and the Post-Cold War period

❖ Cold War

- ❖ Well-defined conflict
- ❖ Time to build models and acquire data
- ❖ High analytical quality
- ❖ Some doubts concerning relevance (How could a WW III look like?)

Continued...characteristics of...

❖ Post-Cold War Period

- ❖ Uncertainties (actors, goals, targets, means) concerning conflicts
- ❖ Lack of time to build new models
- ❖ Ad hoc – methods (problem with quality) or old models (problem with relevance in a new context)

Background and Approach

Observation 1

To try to plan for everything (maximum uncertainty) or to base planning on some general trends (e.g. in technology) will not end up constructively (e.g. too conservative or too future-oriented, “pet projects”, special interests like industry etc).

References:

Boot M.: *War Made New. Technology Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to today.* Gotham Books. New York 2006.

Kagan F.W.: *Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy.* Encounter Books. New York 2006.

Murray W. and Knox M.: The Future behind us. Ch. 10, pp 175-194 in Knox M. and Murray W. (Eds): *The Dynamics of military revolution 1300-2050.* Cambridge University Press 2001.

Observation 2

During the Cold War the threat changed gradually (even if there were some surprises). There were large defence bureaucracies on both sides which gave a certain continuity. Some of today's threats could change much more rapidly. This must be countered by a combination of flexibility and adaptability. The defence must be more agile in several dimensions.

Observation 3

About uncertainties

Cold War:

Known: - adv. – WP

- over-all goals
- type of units/weapons (most of them)

Unknown: - point of time for an attack

- strategy/means (esp. WMD)

Continious..about uncertainties...

Post-Cold War:

Known: - threats/problems on a general level
(terrorists, prol. of WMD, failed states)

Unknown: - goals, targets and means (terrorists)
- prol. of WMD to whom, which...
- failed states (which, when,
dynamics...)

Observation 4

Security is a widening concept. The demand for security seems to be increasing among the citizens in the post-modern world. The countermeasures against different threats and risks do not easily fit into the traditional structure of ministries and agencies however. In the long run there will be reorganisations. Until then the borderline problems must be managed anyway. Military analysts must broaden their perspectives

Our Conclusion

It is probably wise to reallocate some OA resources from ad-hoc support to a more long-term investment in OA-capacity. The starting point should be near-term and future types of conflicts

Security Scenarios/Problems

Scenarios from Foghelin J.: Impacts of the New Societal Conflicts. pp 41-66 in Axberg S. and Foghelin J. (Eds): *Perspectives on Military Technology*. The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. Department of Military Technology. Fälth & Hässler, Värnamo, Sweden 2006.

Scenario 1: Nuclear war between states

→ *Scenario*

Two newly nuclearized states, each with a limited number of nuclear warheads, start a war in which nuclear warheads are used early by both parties. The reasons for early use of nuclear weapons are mainly lack of intelligence concerning intentions and the risk of pre-emption from the other side.

→ *Problems and questions*

Which actions could have been taken by the states or by the world community to prevent the outbreak of the nuclear war?

How could the war be limited, i.e., ending before all nuclear warheads have been used?

Scenario 2: A conventional intrastate war

❖ *Scenario*

This scenario is about two (post)-modern states with modern armed forces in a conventional war against each other. The war starts with a surprise (pre-emptive) attack from one of the parties.

❖ *Problems and questions*

The basic question is whether our perceptions of an “Industrial war” are still valid for a modern state-state war. Many things have changed, both soft (societal organization...) and hard (technologies used...), since WW II.

Scenario 3. A stabilizing operation by a western coalition. The operation takes time, and counterinsurgency/ counter-terrorism is needed

❖ *Scenario*

An intrastate conflict develops in a state of concern for many other states in the world.

Mandated by the UN, a coalition of several willing states initiates a stabilizing operation. In spite of some initial successes the operation runs into difficulties in the form of insurgencies and terrorism.

Scenario 3. - continued

❖ *Problems and questions*

Criteria for continuation of the operation.

Taking into account earlier experiences, what can be done to improve the situation (policy, technology, tactics, and type of personnel...)?

What could have been done before the operation to improve the probability of success?

Taking into account earlier difficulties of these types of operations, should the conclusion be to abstain and delimit the operation to a sort of containment?

Scenario 4. A pan-European intifada

❖ Scenario

A coordinated, in time, action takes place all over Europe. Islamist fundamentalist groups bomb many places simultaneously.

❖ *Problems and questions*

How can you prevent this scenario from taking place at all?

Which counteractions should be taken and by whom (police, gendarmerie, military)?

Possible coordination of the crisis management through EU/Brussels?

Scenario 5. A nuclear threat is directed against the EU in general (or a specific EU-member)

Scenario

A threat is announced by a terrorist group or a “rogue state.” A nuclear device will explode somewhere within the EU if certain conditions are not fulfilled. Nothing is said in the message about the type of nuclear device and how it is going to be delivered.

Problems and questions

How to handle this crisis situation in general?

Information to the public through mass media?

Searching for bombs?

Air defence?

Border control?

Possible operations in the threatening rogue state?

Deterrence (by nuclear means)?

Scenario 6. A coordinated bio-attack by terrorists against major airports within the EU

❖ *Scenario*

Anthrax is spread by aerosols simultaneously at a number of airports. No pre-warning has been given.

❖ *Problems and questions*

How to identify the biological agents?

Restrictions on movement in and out of the airports concerned? How to be sure which are not concerned?

Handling of mass-media? Crisis communication strategy?

Coordination from EU/Brussels?

Vaccines (production, distribution, priorities...)?

Scenario 7. A massive attack against major nodes (by bombing but also through cyberspace) of the banking systems

❖ Scenario

A cyber-attack against the banking system is carried through by a combination of physical bombing and cyberspace. The chaos created will be used to transfer money to an organized crime group.

❖ Problems and questions

How much damage can you accomplish through a combination of a physical and a cyberspace attack?

Can you use the chaos for making money?

Crisis management in different dimensions?

Possible Contributions from the (Military) OA

The Nuclear Landscape

- Regional nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear terrorism
- Great powers nuclear relations
- Security implications of increased interest in nuclear energy

Reference:

Bernstein P.I., Caves Jr J.P. and Reichart J.F.: *The Future Nuclear Landscape*. Occasional Paper No 5, April 2007. NDU, Washington D.C.

Scenario 1: Nuclear war between States

- The roles of nuclear weapons (modernized arsenals) in conflicts between great powers
- Scenarios concerning regional nuclear wars
- The role of C4IRS in preventing and limiting nuclear wars

Reference:

Lieber K.A. and Press D.G.: Superiority Complex. Why America's growing nuclear supremacy may make war with China more likely. *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2007

Scenario 2: A conventional intrastate war

- ❖ How could conventional intrastate wars look like in the future taking into account new technologies, fewer units, changed political restrictions (?), role of the mass media...

There results could be used as inputs to new defence structures

Scenario 3. A stabilizing operation by a western coalition. The operation takes time, and counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism is needed

The success stories of counterinsurgency operations or even international operations in general seems to be few (one of the few exceptions often mentioned is the Malayan Emergency 1948-60). Great early (public) expectations of solving important problems with limited resources in a short time are seldom met

Continued... Scenario 3...

The consequences for the future could be

- ❖ A tougher selection process of possible operations
- ❖ Improvement of the way to do the operations
- ❖ More realistic assessments of time and resources needed

Analytical support to international operation could be given during the different phases

- ❖ Decision concerning participation in an operation:
 - ❖ Importance of operation (dynamics etc)
 - ❖ Clarification of goals
 - ❖ Match between goals and resources
 - ❖ Risks

Continued... Scenario 3...

→ Planning of the operation

→ Clarification of tasks, equipment, logistics...

→ Operation

→ Criteria of progress, follow-up

→ Change of tactics...

→ Lessons-learned

→ A critical assessment of the operation

References:

Dobbins J. F.: "America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq". SURVIVAL, vol. 45. No 4. Winter 2003-2004. pp. 87-110.

Fishel S.T. and Manwaring M.G.: *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman. USA 2006.

Heuser B.: The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*. Vol. 30, No 1, 153-171, February 2007.

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McIvor A.D. (Ed): *Rethinking the principles of war*.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. WASHINGTON D.C.

Eiland G.: The Changing Nature of War: Six New Challenges. Pp 15-22 in *Strategic ASSESSMENT*. Volume 10, No 1. June 2007 (Published by The Institute for National Security Studies. Tel Aviv. Israel)

Challenge 1: Asymmetric Wars in a Populated Arena

Challenge 2: Civil-Military Relations

Challenge 3: Organizational and Process Changes

Challenge 4: Technology

Challenge 5: Media

Challenge 6: Expectations vs. Reality.

Scenario 4. A pan-European intifada

- Coordination between the MSs (areas as intelligence, crisis communication...)
- The role of the military

Scenario 5. A nuclear threat is directed against the EU in general (or a specific EU-member).

- Crisis management in different aspects
- The role of military units

Scenario 6. A coordinated bio-attack by terrorists against major airports within the EU

- Models of spread of diseases taking into account different countermeasures
- Vaccines (production, distribution, priorities...)
- Crisis management

Reference:

Foghelin J.: Terrorism. Actors – Goals – Targets – Means. A starting point for a Net Assessment. pp 44-51 in *The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. Proceedings and Journal 1*, 2006.

Scenario 7. A massive attack against major nodes (by bombing but also through cyberspace) of the banking systems

- Damage assessments
- Robustness of IT-systems
- Crisis management

International cooperation

Investments in new knowledge and tools requires resources. It should be possible within EU (NATO) to cooperate. A common knowledge base could also be of help giving decision support to our governments in cases where cooperation is needed for operations, crisis management...