

# Lessons from CT Operations in NI

Presentation to ISMOR 24

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
- Background
- The Vulnerability of Patrols
- The Use of Helicopters for Surveillance
- The Use of Cameras for Surveillance
- Terrorist Activity
- The Military Response to the Studies
- Applicability to Current Ops
- VIP Lessons



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# Northern Ireland



**8 Bde  
TAOR**

**39 Bde  
TAOR**

**Belfast**

**3 Bde  
TAOR**

**South  
Armagh**



# Study Scope, Method and Data

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- "To quantify the significance of factors which are perceived to influence the incidence of attacks on Security Force patrols, concentrating on those factors over which the Security Forces could exert some operational influence."
- Data Sources
  - Patrol Reports & Honesty Traces
  - Radio & Helicopter Flying Logs
  - G3 Incident Reports
  - G2 Incident Reports
  - RMP Incident Reports
  - Eye witness accounts



# Definition - OA

MATT



Scientists have  
discovered a link  
between  
not eating your  
greens  
and  
being hit by a  
saucepan



# Patrol Attacks in Belfast

	Foot	Joint	Mobile
Exposure	48	23	65
Expected Attacks	13	6	18
Attacks	7	0	<b>31</b>

	Foot	Joint	Mobile
Area 1	5	0	5
Area 2	2	0	<b>26</b>

Area 2	Joint	Mobile
Exposure	21	37

- Disproportionate number of attacks on mobiles
- The problem is in Area 2
- This is not merely due to there being more patrolling in Area 2



# Vulnerability of Mobile Patrols in Area 2

- Specific Targeting of Mobiles
- Mobile Patrol Signature:
  - Grey - Green - Grey – Green
- Mobile Patrols operating in isolation
- No evidence of mobiles walking their vehicles
- Patterns encouraged by Army training



# The Use of Surveillance Helicopters

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
17 terrorist attacks on the Security Forces  
while helicopter aloft

Range	Attacks	Suppression?
<0.5 km	0	Absolute
0.5 - 2.0	3	Effective
2.0 - 3.0	6	Limited
> 3.0 km	8	Little or None



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
# The Communication Delay



It took a minimum of 5 minutes  
to task the helicopter




Bde HQ




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# Helicopter Task Duration




# The Use of Surveillance Cameras










## Patrol Composition

of team members and their equipment

NIPIN	Weapon	Equipment	ECM	FRG
J4978	SABO		None	<input type="radio"/>
B7982	SABO		None	<input type="radio"/>
M8274	SABO		None	<input type="radio"/>
M4375	SABO		None	<input type="radio"/>
There were no RUC with this team				



# Military Appreciation of PROMISES

- “[PROMISES] was enthusiastically received by all the troops who saw it and would be a significant operational enhancement.”
- “[We] would like to see this project developed as a matter of priority and are keen that a system is brought into use as soon as is practically possible.”

COS 39 Inf Bde - April 1996



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# Comd 39 Bde's briefing of the results

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- Mobile Patrols – Improve All Arms Cooperation
- Briefed to RUC - [Mobile] Patrols in [Area 2]
- Patrol Patterns – Sizes, Timing, Patrol Signature Grey/Green /Grey/Green
- Patrol Database
- Automatic GPS Logging
- Request for more Helicopter Hours
- Helicopter Approaches – Not Just from NE
- Brigade Control Net
- Briefing Future Units – Now in [pre-deployment] Package



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# Summary of Benefits

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- Improved Command and Control
- Independent Evidence to RUC
- Refocused our Operational Thinking
- Assistance in Operational Planning
- Development of Tactical Procedures
- Development of Technology

Comd 39 Bde - Nov 1996



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# Applicability to Current Operations

- Terrorist Culture: PIRA were a very “risk averse” organisation. They did not do “intentional suicide”
- Primacy: The Army was in support of the civil authority in Northern Ireland. This could, and did, lead to problems with counter-terrorist operations. In particular, it could and did lead to increased pattern-setting and predictability





# Applicability to Current Operations

- Knowledge of the Ground: PIRA had the advantage in that they had fought over the same ground for over 25 years
- PIRA also refined their tactics over the years
- It is highly likely that the terrorist will have a better understanding of patrol routes and timings than the Army



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# Lessons Identified - Operations

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- Mobile patrols operating without escort are at the greatest risk of attack
  - Walking vehicles through choke or vulnerable points reduces risk
- Pattern setting & predictability makes targeting easier for the terrorist
  - Logistic movement adds to patterns and predictability
- The terrorist can and does understand and use these patterns



# Lessons Identified - The Terrorist

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- Contrary to the myth, the terrorist is NOT unpredictable
- Analyses of his activities have shown that he does set patterns and can be predictable
- Understanding of these patterns can be used to the benefit of the security forces.



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# Recommendations

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- The introduction of a Patrol Report Database, seeded with recent enemy activity, including an analysis and visualisation tool
- Constant review of Military Training to ensure that the tactics do not lead to pattern making and predictability; including practice and adaptation
- The introduction surveillance capabilities across the whole of the EM spectrum, fixed, mobile, airborne and at all levels.
- The maintenance of Operational Archives to enable operational reviews to improve operational efficiency
- Provision of continuous first and second line OA support.



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