

# **More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About Cornwallis Keynotes**

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# Purpose

- Review Cornwallis keynote addresses
- Summarize
- Assess the extent to which we responded to challenges

# Sources and *Modus Operandus*

- One pre-Cornwallis proceeding (what does he mean by that?)
- Twelve Cornwallis proceedings
- Notes from Cornwallis XIII

# The Keynoters

- I (1996) E. P. Visco ('nuff said)
- II (1997) P. Anderson, OR, ND Hq, Cda
- III (1998) V. Roske, US Joint Staff
- IV (1999) A. Morrison, Pearson Centre & LTG J. W. Kinzer, US Army, ret.
- V (2000) MG John Drewienkiewicz, Royal College of Defence Studies, UK
- VI (2001) LTG Manfred Eisle, Bundeswehr, ret.

# The Keynoters (continued)

- VII (2002) Dame Margaret J. Anstee, UN ret., UK & Amb. Robert W. Farrand, US Foreign Service, ret.
- VIII (2003) MG Anders Lindstrom, Swedish Home Guard
- IX (2004) COL Karl Ernst Graf Strachwitz, Bundeswehr, General Staff & Dayton Maxwell, US AID

# The Keynoters (continued)

- X (2005) Dr. Pauline Baker, Fund for Peace & MG Walter Natynczyk, Cda
- XI (2006) Howard Roy Williams, Ctr for Humanitarian Cooperation & Walter S. Clark, Univ of S. FL
- XII (2007) Leonard R. Hawley, US State Dept (ret) & MG Chris Brown, UK
- XIII (2008) Amb Timothy M. Carney, US

# What Did They Say?

- I: Visco “Then and Now”
  - Definition of Keynote
  - Lessons from history of military analysis
  
- II: Anderson “Military Operations Research and Canadian Forces Peacekeeping Operations”
  - **Is there really a military operations analysis problem?**
  - **Understanding the basic elements of PSO**
  - **Soft MOEs**
  - **Many sided, Many objectives, Many value sets, Many time scales**

# What Did They Say?

## (continued)

- **III: Roske “Quick Response Analysis for the Future Joint Environment”**
  - Analyst is conductor; organizing & guiding decision makers, subject experts, and stakeholders, along a disciplined path to insight
- **IVA: Morrison “Civil-Military Interactions”**
  - New paradigm? What would it look like?
  - UN replaced?
  - Realities to be recognized?
- **IVB: Kinzer “UN Mission in Haiti”**
  - Force protection should not dominate!

# What Did They Say?

## (continued)

- **V: Drewienkiewicz “Getting Missions Started”**
  - Easier to expand rather than re-structure a structure
  - Staff planning capacity is a limited resource
  - Headquarters can be formed and trained in 90 days if efforts are sequenced gradually
  - Modules are better than individuals
  - Don’t re-equip as the force is being deployed
  - Infiltration is preferable to a ‘Big Bang’
  - In an alliance, everything takes longer
- **VI: Eisle “Peace Operations and Humanitarian Interventions in a Time of Change”**
  - Conflict at the UN: Territorial integrity & state sovereignty vs. universal validity of human rights (particularly in the case of humanitarian assistance & disaster relief)

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- VIIA: Anstee
  - Complementary civilian and military action & close cooperation between the two
  - Spoiler in the peace processes is invariably political expediency
- VIIB: Farrand: “Brcko, Crucible of Peace in the Balkans”
  - Success: Brcko Law Revision Commission
  - BLRC itself was dismantled on budgetary grounds

# What Did They Say?

## (continued)

- **VIII: Linstrom “Governance and Stability”**
  - Experiences at CENTCOM
  - Emphasized planning approaches
  - Collaboration & cooperation before, during & after deployment
- **IXA: Strackwizt “Does the Defense of Europe Start on the Foothills of the Hinukush?”**
  - Experience with NATO (ISAF?) in Afghanistan
  - Measure of NATO commitment and perseverance
  - NATO must maintain a flexibility of strategy, including ability to change objectives (e.g., focus on drug trafficking)

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- **IXB: Maxwell “Are We Reaching the Threshold to Overcome the Obstacles for Effective CIV-MIL Cooperation Toward Mission Achievement?”**
  - **Political imperatives vs realistic time frames**
  - **Shortfalls in building security capabilities**
  - **Priority focus on short term**
  - **Inadequate civilian planning & expeditionary capability**
  - **Information control**
  - **Inadequate planning for post-conflict actions**

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- **XA: Baker “Threat Convergence & Failing States: A New Agenda for Analysts”**
  - **Threats: WMD, terrorism, failing states, & convergence of the 3**
  - **Failure to understand causes & consequences of state decay**
  - **Need approach to convergence (interactions, information exchange)**
- **XB: Natynczyk “Actionable Statistics”**
  - **Indicators of impact of CJTF 7 (Baghdad)**
  - **Progress: civilian casualties, attacks, control transition, tips, return to normality (water, schools, etc), elections**

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- XIA: Williams “Transition from Conflict to the Beginnings of Reconstruction”
  - **Need interagency & cross-community working groups**
  - **Objectives clearly related to realistic options**
  - **Funding related to objective possibilities**
  - **Training & preparation must reflect the multi-faceted needs of transitions**
  - **Wide spread distribution of information on the states of transition essential**

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- XIB: Clark “Stabilization & Reconstruction & the Humanitarian-Military Dilemma”
  - **Conflict & cooperation between US Defense & State Depts**
  - **Progress towards comprehensive planning**
  - **Still a long way to go**
- XIIA: Hawley “Policy & Strategies for International Intervention”
  - **Need ‘empowering UNSC mandate’**
  - **Need influential mission leaders**
  - **Need implementation of 4 interlocking strategies: political, security, rule-of-law, & political-economic**

# What Did They Say? (continued)

- **XIIB: Brown “Coordinating International Actors in Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Afghanistan 2001-2007”**
  - Harmonization of activities before crisis
  - Determine options for legal & political framework for intervention
  - Planning for intervention will determine strategy of the international community
- **XIII: Carney “Historical Review of 40 Years of Policy Decisions”**
  - Impatience (9 women problem)
  - Unwillingness to listen (arrogance)
  - Ignorance
  - Focus should be on stability

# What Did They Say? In Summary

- Demographics
  - 2 woman, 17 men
  - 7 active civilians
  - 5 active military
  - 5 retired civilians
  - 2 retired military
  - 10 US; 3 each Canada & UK; 2 Germany; 1 Sweden
- Emphases
  - Direct experience with specific operations (Haiti, Kosovo, Brcko, Afghanistan, Iraq, Northern Ireland)
  - Overall agency experiences and needs (OR in CND, US Joint Staff, US CENTCOM, NATO Staffs)
  - New questions & proposal for action
  - Review of peace operations with focus on compliance
  - Humanitarian intervention
  - Military & civilian interactions, particularly in planning
  - Lesson to be drawn from history of military analysis

# Summation

- Emphases
  - Peace support operations
  - Military agencies & analysis
  - Revised role for UN
  - Interagency requirements
- Redundancies
  - Interagency collaboration
  - Mission clarity
  - UN specific support

# Generalizations

- **Most keynote addresses were not keynotes, in terms of formal definition.**
- **“Keynote” itself may be an inappropriate designation for invited addresses.**
- **Cornwallis programs, with few exceptions, do not appear to pick up on input from previous keynote addresses.**
- **Domination [too strong a word?] by the US.**

# What Did Some Non-Keynoters Say?

- V: Morrison “For the future, may there be many more Cornwallis Group meetings! It is imperative that we—all as members of the New Peacekeeping Partnership—continue to work together, that we continue to explore new avenues of] research and understanding. The Cornwallis Group, as an international group of scientists, mathematicians, military personnel, humanitarians and diplomats, is to be congratulated for its efforts and we are honored to have them convene annually at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre...”
- VII: Dunsmore “...Peace operations today are multidisciplinary, complex and increasingly dangerous endeavors...Our sense of **what** we are attempting to do has changed. We recognize that peace is something that must be constructed, and, like any construction job, it requires blueprints, skilled professionals and craftspeople, resources and coordination...I came to understand the importance of reflecting on the question of **who**. There are clearly two categories of who—the international community on the one hand, and local, national, and in some cases, regional actors on the other...The protagonists of the design, planning and implementation process need to be those most directly affected by the outcome. The role of the international community becomes one of creating the enabling conditions...The existence of a peace instrument provides a window of opportunity. If adequate support is not provided in a timely fashion, that window can close.”