



THE IMPORT FOR AND CHALLENGES TO OR PRESENTED BY THE NEW U.S. OPERATIONAL AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINES

FM-3

FM-3-24 MCWP



FM 3-0

Operations Doctrine

- ***“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense Doctrine shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”***
- **Persistent Conflict**
- **Commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force in conducting full spectrum operations.**
- **Achieve victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict only by conducting military operations in consort with diplomatic, informational and economic efforts.**

Fm 3-0 Forward by General Wallace, TRADOC Commander



FM-3 ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

- **Chapter 1 – Operational Environment**
 - Global Nature – Instability and persistent conflict – need for unified action
 - Soldiers and leaders are Army’s most important advantages
 - Centrality of jointness
- **Chapter 2 – Continuum of Operations**
 - Peacetime military engagement – limited intervention – peace ops – irregular workforce
- **Chapter 3 – Full Spectrum Operations**
 - Achieve decisive results through offense, defense, stability or civil support operations
- **Chapter 4 – Combat Power**
 - Total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities a military unit/formation can apply at a given time



FM-3 ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK continued

- **Chapter 5 – Command and Control**
 - Operations process – plan, prepare, execute, and assess
 - Commander – understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess

- **Chapter 6 – Operational Art**
 - The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns and major operations and organize and employ multi-tier forces
 - Commanders use operational art to envision how to create conditions that define the national strategic end state

- **Chapter 7 – Information Superiority**
 - Tasking to shape the environment
 - ISR
 - Knowledge management
 - Information management

- **Chapter 8 – Strategic and Operational Reach**
 - How to maximize both factors by increased operational maneuver, a joint approach, mastering expeditionary operations and extending force projections.




Elements of Full Spectrum Operations

“The Most Important Chapter in the Book”

<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Offensive Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Movement to contact• Attack• Exploitation• Pursuit <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces• Seize key terrain• Deprive the enemy of resources• Develop intelligence• Deceive and divert the enemy• Create a secure environment for stability operations	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Defensive Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mobile defense• Area defense• Retrograde <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations• Gain time• Achieve economy of force• Retain key terrain• Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure• Develop intelligence
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Stability Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Civil security• Civil control• Restore essential services• Support to governance• Support to economic and infrastructure development <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide a secure environment• Secure land areas• Meet the critical needs of the populace• Gain support for host-nation government• Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Civil Support Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide support in response to disaster or terrorist attack• Support civil law enforcement• Provide other support as required <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Save lives• Restore essential services• Maintain or restore law and order• Protect infrastructure and property• Maintain or restore local government• Shape the environment for interagency success



Operations Process Expanded






Information Superiority

Task	Information Engagement	Command and Control Warfare	Information Protection	Operations Security	Military Deception
Intended Effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inform and educate internal and external publics • Influence the behavior of target audiences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degrade, disrupt, destroy, and exploit enemy command and control 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect friendly computer networks and communication means 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deny vital intelligence on friendly forces to hostile collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confuse enemy decision-makers
Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader and Soldier engagement • Public affairs • Psychological operations • Combat camera • Strategic Communication and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical attack • Electronic attack • Electronic warfare support • Computer network attack • Computer network exploitation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information assurance • Computer network defense • Electronic protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations security • Physical security • Counterintelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military deception



Example of Lines of Effort (Stability)






The AMOS/PETRAEUS Counterinsurgency Doctrine

FM-3-24

Counterinsurgency is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.



The proportion of effort devoted to offensive, defensive, and stability operations within COIN is changed over time in response to the situation and can vary geographically and by echelon.



Main Objective - Achieving Legitimacy

Indicators

- **Security for the populace**
- **Selection of just and fair leadership**
- **Degree of level of popular participation or support of political process**
- **A culturally acceptable level of corruption**
- **A culturally acceptable level and rate of development**
- **A high level of regime acceptance by major social institution**



Methods and Process of Achieving Legitimacy

- **Unity of effort**
- **Realization that political factors are primary**
- **Understanding of environment**
- **Intelligence driving operators**
- **Isolation of insurgents**
- **Security under the rule of law**
- **Long term commitment**
- **Management of information and expectations**
- **Rise of appropriate level of forces**
- **Support host nation**
- **Empower lowest level**
- **Learn and adapt**



Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Operational Practices

<i>Successful practices</i>	<i>Unsuccessful practices</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Emphasize intelligence.• Focus on the population, its needs, and its security.• Establish and expand secure areas.• Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control).• Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous information operations.• Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.• Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits.• Expand and diversify the host-nation police force.• Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.• Embed quality advisors and special forces with host-nation forces.• Deny sanctuary to insurgents.• Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing.• Secure host-nation borders.• Protect key infrastructure.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace.• Conduct large-scale operations as the norm.• Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection.• Focus special forces primarily on raiding.• Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host-nation forces.• Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military's image.• Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures.• Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines.



Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

- **Pre-deployment preparation of the battlefield**
 - Define the operational environment
 - Describe the potential efforts of the operational environment
 - » Society – social structure, groups networks, institutions, organizations, roles, and statures, social norms, culture, identity, beliefs, values, attitudes, belief styles, language, power, authority, interests, essential services, economy, political participation, threat analysis.
- **Illuminate insurgent organization, leadership and tactics**



“Campaign Design May Very Well be the Most Important aspect of Counterinsurgency”

- **Key design consideration**
 - Critical discussion
 - Systems thinking
 - Model making
 - Intuitive decision making
 - Continuous assessment
 - Structured learning



Some Current Challenges

- **Helping define and achieve the desired end state in a climate of persistent and continuing conflict**
- **Reshaping OR to meet this “revolutionary” (*General Wallace’s forward*) departure from past doctrine**
- **Evaluating the efforts of operations designed to overcome the cultural import**
- **Coping with the OR challenges resulting from a reduced emphasis on kinetic measures, and a more complex and ambiguous definition of victory**
- **Redefining the overall scope of the OR role and methods in the “new era.”**
- **Increased and efficient insinuation of the “soft sciences” into the OR process**



What's All This Mean for the OR Analyst?

- **Move from quantitative, traditional, force on force analysis to analysis based on soft science theories and approaches**
 - Less kinetic to more non-kinetic analysis
 - Due to complexity of environments, analyzing secondary, tertiary, and unintended consequences key to success or failure
 - Key is to understand the true situation on the ground
- **Standard modeling and simulations tools will not be sufficient**
- **Scientific method still applicable, but the analysis approach and process may need to be modified**
 - What metrics really matter?
 - What are the operational parameters of importance?
- **Back to the past by including broader range of disciplines – sociologists, anthropologists, economists...**
- **Analyzing supporting functions takes on more importance**
 - Logistics, force protection, financial, information, political