





OPERATIONAL RISK: Impact of Contractor Support



Andrzej Frank
Head OAB HQ ARRC
30 Jul 14





Risk and the Operational Commander

The wise general must consider both favourable and unfavourable factors and:

“He ponders the dangers inherent in the advantages and the advantages inherent in the danger.”

Sun Tzu

“A risk is a chance you take; if it fails you can recover. A gamble is a chance taken; if it fails recovery is impossible.”

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

“Protection in battle is always relative. A man who cannot balance protection against legitimate risk has no business passing on arms, equipment or tactics to be used in battle.”

BG AA Fries



Aim and Issues

- Aim: To enhance HQ ARRC capability to better identify, understand, communicate and exploit risk in order to achieve operational objectives
- Some issues:
 - Is the term Operational Risk appropriate?
 - Is the language of risk communication clear within the HQ and to external elements?
 - What are the key drivers of risk e.g. Log risk
 - Are we addressing risk sufficiently?
 - How can we enhance our risk management capabilities?



Intended Outcomes

- Enhance awareness and understanding of risk - especially its impact across the spectrum of ARRC activities
- Review processes, identify shortfalls and enhancements
- Incorporate insights and lessons
- Adopt a longer-term review and continued improvement process

Study Genesis

- Ex ARRC/CAESAR Staff Ride
- Sicily, July/Aug 1943 Canadian 231 Inf Bde taking of Assoro, a hilltop village, with night assault up an 'impregnable' slope
- Discussions :
 - Body armour and weight
 - Impact of removing it
 - Who orders?
 - Who carries the risk?
- Tactical with operational impact
 - *Note Gen Krulak's 'Strategic Corporal'*



**(National, International & Alliance)
Policy Objectives**

Economic

Diplomatic

Military

GRAND STRATEGY

‘AGREE AND DIRECT’

Defines an approach to deliver policy objectives using the primary components of national power (diplomatic, economic & military) [which may include conflict resolution].

STRATEGIC

‘DEFINE AND SHAPE’

Develops the Military Strategy - the why? – defines the ends and allocates the means. Also defines the objectives and end state that would constitute success and which shapes the development of initial theatre strategy.

OPERATIONAL

‘SYNCRONISE AND SUSTAIN’

Balances ways and means to achieve the ends. Defines the strategy to meet the end state and designs the campaign, deducing the big idea to unlock the central problem and the potential sequence of major operations required to achieve success. Also organise and employ forces, allocate finite resources, set and sustain the theatre, produce theatre policy and disseminate guidance whilst synchronising the activity of all elements.

TACTICAL

‘COORDINATE AND EXECUTE’

Plan and execute battles, engagements and supporting activities. People centric, multidimensional fire and movement.

Strategic Level
Objectives

Operational Level
Campaign Plan

Tactical Level
Objectives
(Battles, Engagements, Activities)



Historical Context – Sedan 1940

- Ardennes-Sedan sector considered impenetrable
- Intense air bombardment, Stuka psychological effect and misreporting of GE advance
- FR slow response and poor battle picture missed chance to throw GE back across River Meuse
- Guderian ignored High Command orders to wait for Inf Divs to catch up and pushed West with 2 Panzer Divs
- Speedy advance into undefended FR rear and to the Channel – risk or gamble?





Risks, CCIRs, CONPLANS

NATO UNCLASSIFIED REL EX AW/14/AC/14/AF/4

Risks (Extraction from FF CoG Analysis)

1. TSF will have insufficient capability to protect its territorial integrity and control its internal security at the NATO end date.
2. No political consent from GoT to allow TFOR to use bases in TYT to launch offensive operations into PET.
3. GoT suffers a critical loss of legitimacy at the national, regional or local level that renders it incapable of governing.
4. STE intervenes to impede TFOR activity; through the use of force.
5. Risk of exacerbating TYT instability by training the TSF to beyond GoT political control.
6. NATO credibility, reputation and a perception of mission support to an openly corrupt GoT.
7. POK political intervention in the Hanish Islands dispute to UNSC, which undermines the legitimacy of the TFOR mission.
8. Increased EKM pressure on the CUPEF results in their withdrawal from the Pocket.
9. The loss/denial of OSMAN Port.



NATO UNCLASSIFIED REL EX AW/14/AC/14/AF/4

Draft CCIR¹

Ser	CCIR	Associated Decision Point (DP)	Remarks
1 PIR	What activities are STE using to negatively affect TYT and TFOR covertly?	Re-orientation of TFOR to DETER further STE direct engagement	CONPLAN 1/2
2 PIR	What military activities are STE using to negatively affect TYT and TFOR overtly?	Re-orientation of TFOR to match near peer threat	CONPLAN 1/2/4
3 PIR	What is KNAF doing to support EKM activities in the TP?	Re-orientation of TFOR to DETER KAM e of in ex	
4 FFIR	Is the GoT collapsing or losing the ability to govern?	Diseng Tytan	
5 PIR	What level of control do the OAGs possess in GON?	TFOR : consol	

NATO UNCLASSIFIED REL EX AW/14/AC/14/AF/4

NATO UNCLASSIFIED REL EX AW/14/AC/14/AF/4

Proposed CONPLANS

1. Protection of Hanish Islands.
2. Reorientation of TFOR to counter STE/KAM military activity.
3. BeM Straits blocked.
4. *In extremis* support for HA – trigger by threshold, not geography.
5. Sudden withdrawal of Cerasian Union Peace Enforcement Force (CUPEF) from Tori Pocket.
6. Generate a reserve to neutralise OAG threats to GoT sovereignty.
7. Loss of key TFOR/TYT infra (APOD/SPOD).

Initial CCIRs derived from COI's Task Analysis and reworked by G2 dated 12/11/14




NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Risk Profile Matrix



Ref	Risk	Mitigation	Progress
1	TSF will have insufficient capability to protect its territorial integrity and control its internal security.	Contracting , early transfer of the risk to SACEUR and the NAC.	Linked to CCIR 4
2	No political consent from the GoT to allow TFOR to use bases in TYT to launch offensive operations into PET.	Intense diplomatic negotiations and explanation of mutual benefits; alleviate fears of implications post TFOR departure..	Continued diplomatic/military dialogue
3	GoT suffers a critical loss of legitimacy at the national, regional or local level that renders it incapable of governing.	IC/NATO support to protect GoT from strategic shocks. Diplomatic and military efforts to reduce STE support to OAGs.	Linked to CCIR 4&5 & CONPLAN 7
4	STE intervenes to impede TFOR activity; through the use of proxies or via direct military intervention.	Military efforts to deter STE direct military intervention and disrupt continuing support to OAGs.	Linked to CCIR 1 & 2 & CONPLAN 1/2/4
5	Risk of exacerbating TYT instability by training the TSF troops to have a capability beyond GoT political control.	IC to develop robust political institutions capable of maintaining political primacy. MOD and MOI receive similar levels of support.	Linked to CCIR 4
6	NATO credibility, reputation and a perception of mission failure is exacerbated by tacit support to an openly corrupt GoT.	TFOR engagement strategy with IC and GoT must articulate NATO's obligation to uphold the RoL and international law.	Linked to CCIR 4
7	POK political intervention in the Hanish Islands dispute leads to division within the UNSC, which undermines the legitimacy of the TFOR mission.	Continued diplomatic efforts within the UNSC to ensure enduring tacit POK consent for TFOR mission.	Continued diplomatic dialogue.
8	Increased EKM pressure on the CUPEF results in their withdrawal from the Tori Pocket.	Dialogue to ensure CU support for the CUPEF endures. Develop CONPLANS for TFOR <i>in extremis</i> support.	Diplomatic dialogue, CCIR 3 & CONPLAN 6
9	The loss/denial of OSMAN Port.	Sufficient Force Protection measures taken to ensure that OSM is secure.	OSM understood to be key terrain

Summary Risk Profile



No progress

Moderate progress

Good progress

Complete



Changing Operating Environment

- Combined, Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental and Multinational (CJIIM)
- Coalition, Congested, Contested, Cluttered, Connected, Constrained
- Changes in capabilities
- Increased contractor support
- Technological developments - own and adversary
- Legal constraints
- Impact of Social Media and tempo of the news cycle



Log Risk

Contractor support considered a key risk area:

- Multinational coalition complexity & nature of the Op
- Uncertainty of contractual and physical dependencies
- Ethical issues relating to contractor Duty of Care
- Complacency and risk-blindness due to contracting-out
- Corruption, illegal practices and force perceptions






Log Risk – contd.

- Risk of funding criminal patronage networks and enemies
- Limited control of initial contracts and networks
- Competition for resources – military/IO/NGO/local
- Medical risk – particularly at key stages of vulnerability
- N.B. COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance – *8 Sep 2010*



Exploring/understanding the risks



- OSINT
- Network/threat analysis
- Red Teaming
- Impact analysis/Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset (RCAT)
- TOPFAS Systems Analysis Tool
- Causal link analysis





Log Risk Study Activities

- ACDS Log Ops and DCDC engagement
- Previous studies and historical cases
- Exploitation of procurement contractor impact analysis
- Resourced investigation to develop approaches
- Engagement with industry/OGDs/IOs.
- National and international community of practice/interest engagement



Log Risk Issues/Questions



- Identification of contractor engagements
- How to determine networks/interactions, map dependencies and identify critical nodes
- How to quantify the risk:
 - Logistic
 - Mission
 - Campaign
- How to represent the risk to decision makers
- Measures to minimise risk – e.g. contracting principles



Ideas & Insights

FORTUNA

